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Introduction 
Among the concepts most commonly associated with General de 
Gaulle's foreign policy, the expressions "grandeur" - or more precisely 
"grandeur de la France" - tend to dominate. 1 Taken in isolation such a 
concept conjures up an image of a foreign policy exclusively concerned 
with power and rank, and dominated by great power politics. On the other 
hand the majority of the states with whom France had to deal, either on 
a bilateral basis or within a multilateral framework such as the wartime 
alliance, the Western Union, NATO, or the European Communities, fell 
outside the category of great powers. It therefore seems worth asking what 
place, if any, such minor or "middle" powers occupied in de Gaulle's view 
of international relations. Did such states have a particular role to play, or 
were they in varying degrees - for example in alliance contexts - just 
pawns in the great power game? If the latter, how could such a view be 
squared with another of de Gaulle's hallowed concepts, that of "la 
souverainet6 nationale"? 
General de Gaulle's first experiences as an actor in international 
relations was as leader of the "Free French" during the Second World 
War. This makes the war years a natural point of departure for an 
investigation of his vision or view of international politics. The wartime 
years were of course an abnormal period of international relations in 
almost every way. The abnormality was compounded by the special 
circumstances attending France's military defeat in 1940: France's official 
status as partly occupied, partly a nominally independent "Etat" under the 
Vichy regime, and de Gaulle's uncertain status as the self-appointed 
guardian of the "real France" - "la France combattante". 
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As formative years for a more long-term conception of international 
relations and of France's place in the world, the years from 1940 to 1944 
were therefore conducive to a somewhat distorted perspective on the way 
foreign policy is made and conducted. Military strength and power were 
inevitably the predominant determinants of influence. Economic strength, 
social cohesion, and a national political consensus, while important, tended 
to be measured only in terms of their contribution to the country's war-
making capacity . 
Against such a background, it should come as no surprise if de Gaulle's 
vision of international relations, and of the role of France, became 
indelibly marked by an almost obsessive concern with a hierarchy of 
power whose "ultima ratio" was military strength. As a corollary one 
would expect to find a concomitant indifference - perhaps even mingled 
with contempt - towards nations that lacked such power. Does the 
historical evidence support such an image of de Gaulle and his views? 
The War Years 
De Gaulle's concern with power or the lack thereof is clear already in 
the first volume of his war memoirs. The humiliating situation of Frimce -
"qui, elle, n'avait rien," is compared to 
"les gouvemements refugies en Angleterre, dont sans doute les forces 
etaient faibles, mais dont la representation et 1 'influence intemationales 
subsistaient. 
Car, pour chacune des nations d 'Europe que submergeaient les armees 
d'Hitler, l'Etat avait emporte sur des rivages libres l'independance et la 
souverainete ( ... ). Si depouilles qu 'ils fussent, if leur restait toujours 
quelque chose. "2 
Already at this stage, however, emerges de Gaulle' s vision of France 
as the natural leader of Europe, and of himself as the true representative 
of France. He speaks of the unhappiest of the exiles, the Poles and the 
Czechs, who saw in him a hope and a rallying point because he remained 
faithful to the traditions of France. "Jamais peut-Stre, mieux qu'au fond de 
ce gouffre, je n'ai senti ce qu'etait, pour le monde, la vocation de la 
France."' 
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De Gaulle's vision of France as a future leader of Europe was clearly 
linked with what he saw as the dependence of the middle and minor 
European nations on either "les anglo-saxons" or the Soviet Union. Even 
if their formal sovereignty was not contested by the allied great powers, 
the nations in exile "n'en subissaient pas mains le sort penible des faibles 
livres a la discretion des forts".4 Hence their firm conviction, according to 
de Gaulle, that the equilibrium in Europe and their own future depended 
on the restoration of France. 
In support of this concept of France as the leader of Europe de Gaulle 
cites in particular the example of Czechoslovakia, whose apparent good 
relations with the Soviet Union· shielded an under-current of deep 
apprehensions about the future. He then quotes President Benes to the 
effect that only if France resumed her righful rank and role in Europe 
could his country avoid the risks inherent in an exclusive alliance with the 
Kremlin.S In a similar but less hopeful vein general Sikorski is reported 
as seeing a Western counter-balance as Poland's only chance to achieve 
an understanding with Stalin. "Le moment venu, qui aidera la Pologne? Ce 
sera la France ou personne. "6 
Without necessarily questioning the sincerity of such statements, made 
by Benes and Sikorski in conversations with de Gaulle, they hardly reflect 
the whole picture as regards the two countries' views of France and her 
future role. De Gaulle nevertheless appropriates the vision. Subsequently, 
with "La France Combattante" more firmly established and widely 
recognised under a provisional government in Alger, de Gaulle expands 
the perspective. By 1943 he begins to see France as the only power able 
and willing to prevent a Soviet-American hegemony over Europe. And 
France would not only be guarding her own interests: "Elle y serait, au 
surplus, comme le parte-parole des moyennes et petites nations. "7 
Up until then de Gaulle's perspective as regards middle and small 
powers seems limited to the "Etats de la Vistule, du Danube, des 
Balkans", whose independence is likely to be sacrificed as the price of 
Soviet-American cooperation. But later in 1943, as he begins to concern 
himself with the more long-term problems of the European order, the 
northern European countries are also brought into the picture. During a 
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brief "tour d'horiwn" he notes that the future problems for Belgium and 
the Netherlands are primarily economic, whereas Norway is beginning to 
feel the weight of her Soviet neighbour. All three countries, however, 
seem to look primarily to the United States as their source of strength. He 
also notes, without expressing any particular interest, Belgian schemes for 
a Western European confederation as well as Norway's plans for an 
Atlantic alliance. 
His knowledge of Norway's 'Atlantic policy' stemmed from a con-
versation he had with Ernst F. Hougen, who was Norway's diplomatic 
envoy to the CFLN at Alger, on 17 December 1943. But de Gaulle's 
remarks provide little insight into his own views of postwar international 
and security affairs. Besides stressing the importance of security in the air 
and on the seas, he insists on the necessity of viewing the problems in a 
comprehensive European perspective. However, 
"a d~faut d 'une ~cmiW euro~nne, comprenant aussi bien la Russie que 
les puissances de l'Ouest, on pourrait imaginer une ~curiW Atlantique 
mais largement Atlantique et comprenant, bien entendu, la France."' 
De Gaulle' s main concern at that time is the countries bordering on the 
Mediterranean. He appears to have found among Greek politicians the 
same desire for a French presence to counter-balance that of the leading 
allied powers, and makes unsuccessful attempts to establish contact with 
General Mihailovic in Yugoslavia. Through it all he complains bitterly 
about France being excluded from European affairs by the "Big Three". 
He sees Roosevelt and Churchill as being prepared to abandon Central and 
Eastern Europe to Stalin, and notes again and again the desire of the 
exiled leaders from those countries for a French counterweight 
De Gaulle is far less specific when describing what the policy and 
actions of France would have been if admitted to the inner councils of 
the alliance. Only in the case of Poland does he outline a policy. He finds 
acceptable Stalin's plan to move Poland westward into Prussia and Silesia, 
but would oppose the installation of a Soviet puppet regime in Warsaw. 
But his recipe for a solution hardly meets his own test, according to 
which "La diplomatie ( ... ) ne connait que les realites".9 
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"Je pensais que l' Amerique, l' Angleterre et la France, en affinnant 
conjointement ceci et cela ll la face du monde, en agissant de concert 
dans ce sens aupres des Gouvemements sovietique et polonais, en reservant 
aux flottes combinees de l'Occident l'acres futur des ports de la Baltique, 
quitte ll ouvrir aux navires russes celui des ports de la mer do Nord, 
auraient pu faire en sorte que la liberte filt, finalement, rendue ll la noble 
et vaillante Pologne. "10 
Again, therefore, he seeks umbrage in the image of France and himself 
as the chosen moral leader of Europe. "Ainsi, malgre les conseils 
d'abstention donnes par Washington, Londres, et Moscou, on voyait les 
moyens et petits Etats europeens rechercher notre contact. "11 As final proof 
of this he cites the long list of European governments which in June, 
1944, recognise officially - in open defiance of the advice from the United 
States and Britain - his Provisional Government of the French Republic. 
If our brief review of de Gaulle' s ideas on foreign policy during the 
wartime years have given very few clues to his more long-term vision of 
international relations, the most likely explanation is that in war foreign 
policy forms an integrated and largely subservient part of war policy. 
Urgent concerns connected with the conduct of the war leave little space 
for the luxury of long-term policy planning and preparations. For de 
Gaulle, the permanent and daily preoccupation was to reconstruct France's 
position as a major power. 
However, even in de Gaulle' s relations with the allied great powers 
there may be clues to be found - clues to his view of the nature of 
alliances and of alliance policy. De Gaulle's stormy relations with Great 
Britain, in particular, reflect a view of alliance relationships which points 
very clearly to the problems that de Gaulle was later to create for the 
Atlantic alliance. 
Students of alliance relationships have elaborated a concept which is 
called "dogmatic/nationalist" alliance policy." This is an approach wherein 
an allied government, with complete independence as its point of 
departure, seeks to limit alliance commitments to formally negotiated and 
clearly defmed arrangements, and chooses conflict rather than submitting 
to loose, ad hoc, or informal compromise solutions of the problems of 
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cooperation. Along with this goes a style or a posture dominated by 
questions of prestige and status, and marked by an emphasis on the 
external symbols of independence and national self-determination. 
It will surprise no one that de Gaulle and the Free French present the 
primary example of such an approach to alliance relationships. It was an 
approach which bore the markings of a dangerous gamble, since it carried 
a constant risk of serious conflicts, each of which could have spelt final 
ruin for the frail structure of France in exile. And de Gaulle could hardly 
have been unaware that it was a gamble: one of the causes of the rupture 
between him and admiral Muselier in 1941 was Muselier's "adjurations a 
ne pas mettre en peril les alliances de la France libre par des initiatives 
trop cassantes. "13 
It is also possible in de Gaulle' s posturing to discern an attitude which 
equates power status with an ally's "nuisance value", and which regards 
"loyal allies" with a condescension bordering on contempt. On one 
· occasion he attempted to justify his independent actions by picturing the 
exiles as on the whole a melancholy lot: "C'est pourqu'a la longue ils 
prennent 1' aspeet de leurs hOtes et deviennent un objet de mepris pour leur 
propre peuple."14 Less serious, but nonetheless revealing, is de Gaulle's 
retort to Anthony Edens complaint about France being more difficult to 
handle than all the other exiled allies: "Je n'en doute pas. La France est 
une grande puissance. "15 
The alternative to de Gaulle's alliance policy would have been what 
political scientists have called the "pragmatic/associationist" approach16, 
as exemplified by the policy of the Norwegian government in exile. It 
was a policy marked by a flexible ad hoc approach to the problems of 
allied cooperation, emphasising mutual interests with the aim of mutual 
trust and reasonable, practical compromises. Such a policy required a 
realistic acknowledgement of the dominant position of greater powers, 
and of their right to decide in matters not directly affecting Norwegian 
interests. Having thus established Norway's credentials as a loyal ally, 
the government would then expect to be listened to, and increasingly to 
have influence over, allied policies which concerned vital Norwegian 
interests. 
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The wartime alliance, then, was the test-bed for two contrasting patterns 
for relations between major and minor partners - one based on inde-
pendence and self-determination, the other on inter-dependence and 
integration. Both were attempts to solve one common problem, which in 
its French version was stated as being "comment faire prendre en compte 
par la strategie alliee certains imperatifs nationaux?"17 It may be said, with 
hindsight, that the diametrically opposed French and Norwegian approaches 
to alliance policy were both successful. But whereas de Gaulle's success 
was less due to his policy than to Britain's desire for a restoration of 
France as an important European power, Norway's success was the result 
of a policy concept with important long-term implications for alliance 
relationships between major and minor powers. 
De Gaulle in NATO: Coalition or Integration? 
Being out of power during the formative years of western postwar 
security, de Gaulle has left few indications of how his view of alliance 
relationships may have developed during that period. But in a speech in 
Marseilles in April, 1948, he acknowledged that the postwar situation 
posed new requirements for a successful defence cooperation. His 
preoccupation, naturally, was with Europe, which he considered should 
be organised "en un tout economique et straregique ( ... ) lie aux Etats-
Unis d'Amerique sous forme de garantie reciproque"." At a press 
conference six years later, in April 1954, he was much more specific: 
"Mais je vois 1 'Europe comme elle est. Je la vois etendue de Gibraltar a 
l'Oural, du Spitzberg a la Sicile.( ... ) Une telle association, pour ce qui 
est, par exemple, de la dt!fense, doit ~tre. bien sur, organisee. La reunion 
organique des chefs de gouvemement en exercera la conduite par le moyen 
d 'un organisme specialisee et subordonnee. Des commandements et etats-
majors combines, la mise en commun, pour l'emploi, de !'infrastructure, 
des communications, des ravitaillements, l' adoption des types semblables 
d 'unites, d 'armes, de procedes assureront la cohesion technique des forces 
associes, tdut en laissant a chaque Etat le corps et 1' ame de son annee. "19 
It is difficult to reconcile this image of a "reunion organique des chefs 
de gouvernement" with de Gaulle's subsequent advocacy of a directory for 
NATO composed solely of the three major powers, the United States, 
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Great Britain, and France. And his suggestions about "commandements et 
etats-majors combines", as well as "la mise en commun, pour l'emploi, de 
!'infrastructure, des commuunications, ·des ravitaillements", seem to 
contradict his later decision to withdraw from NATO's integrated defence 
structure. 
·De Gaulle's policy towards NATO has mainly, if not exclusively, been 
studied in terms of a conflict between France and the other major powers 
of the Alliance - particularly, of course, the United States. The views and 
attitudes of the minor powers have largely been ignored. However, 
President Eisenhower in his reply to de Gaulle's "directory" proposal of 
1958 emphasised the interests of the other member states: 
"Nous ne pouvons nous pennettre d'adopter un systeme qui donnerait 
l'impression t1 nos autres allies ( ... ) que des decisions capitales, touchant 
leurs interets vitaux, soot prises sans leur participation. "20 
There can be no doubt that Eisenhower here reflected the deeply felt 
concerns of the minor allies, lest they should be excluded from participa-
tion in important decisions affecting also the alliance. This secret exchange 
of letters did not yet constitute an open challenge. But the gauntlet was 
thrown, and the dimensions of the issue were clearly realised by France's 
Common Market partners as the gist of de Gaulle's demand became 
known. In Alfred Grosser's words: 
"Not without reason they felt that the General's attitude towards the 
weaker in Europe resembled the one for which he justifiably reproached 
the United States on the transatlantic level. But there were two major 
differences: He did not have the same preponderance vis-a-vis the weaker, 
.and could not give them protection. "21 
A reminder of the apprehensions felt by the minor powers came during 
the discussions on the "Fouchet Plan", as the Netherlands and Belgium 
fought to preserve Atlantic relations against de Gaulle' s conception of a 
Europe based on the joint predominance of France and the German 
Federal Republic. Evidently, for the small powers, "the distant superpower, 
the United States, was perceived as less oppressive than the neighbouring 
medium-sized powers and their striving for dominance in Europe."22 
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It is hardly necessary here to retrace the various steps by which de 
Gaulle during the years from 1958 to 1966 gradually sought to regain 
France's freedom of action in defence matters. The staged withdrawals 
of the French Mediterranean, and subsequently the Atlantic and Channel, 
fleets from NATO's command structure in peacetime were signals, but did 
not in themselves constitute a major threat to the integrated defence. 
Navies were mobile, and it had always been understood - even if not 
openly acknowledged - that alliance powers with overseas responsibilities 
had priorities which in a given situation might override their commitments 
to NATO. As for de Gaulle's apparent major preoccupation, the pro-
curement of an independent nuclear deterrent, the various schemes 
discussed-during the 1960s for sharing nuclear weapons information and 
policy-making defused the issue for the time being. Also, as Lothar Ruehl 
has written, 
"Les allies s'etaient habitues a penser que les declarations du General de 
Gaulle depasseraient toujours ses veritables intentions; qu 'il serait beaucoup 
plus conciliant qu'il ne le laissait paraitre."23 
The Crisis of 1966 
De Gaulle' s declaration at his press conference on 21 February 1966, 
followed by his letter to President Lyndon Johnson on 7 March and the 
"aides-memoire" to the other NATO members four days later, set the 
stage for a major crisis situation in the alliance. The decision to withdraw 
from the integrated defence commands and other arrangements was 
momentous enough by itself. But the short time limits allowed for carrying 
out the withdrawals acerbated the crisis, and gave it an air of deliberate 
provocation which seemed calculated to eliminate all hopes of compromi-
se. 
The reactions of the United States and other major NATO members to 
the crisis have been extensively studied and debated. But how were the 
minor powers affected, and what were their reactions? 
The initial reaction of the minor powers was to associate themselves 
with the other members of NATO in a joint declaration, which was made 
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public on 18 March. This affirmed a common determination to maintain 
as far as possible the military and political cooperation established through 
NATO. The process of formulating the declaration revealed certain 
differences of opinion between those who felt a need to castigate France 
and others -particularly Norway, Denmark, and Canada - which felt that 
any polemics would be not only useless, but also counter-productive in 
view of the incumbent negotiations with France. Judging from the 
reactions in Norway, this implied a desire to minimise the disruptive 
effects of the French move. 
In presenting the views of the Norwegian Government to the Storting 
- the national legislative assembly - the Defence Minister outlined two 
principal considerations to be kept in mind during the coming negotations 
about, the modalities of the French withdrawal. Preserving the maximum 
degree of cooperation among the member states was one of them: "As 
long as no alternative has been produced which could offer Norway 
anything like the degree of security provided through western solidarity, 
this was the only way".24 Of particular importance was the preservation of 
the integrated defence structure, not only from considerations of military 
efficiency but also from a desire to forestall nationalistic urges in other 
countries - the latter being a thinly veiled reference to Germany. 
Norway's other main consideration was to avoid lasting damage to 
relations with France: 
"France has herself expressed an interest in cooperative peacetime 
arrangements directly aimed towards a war situation. There is every reason 
to believe that all 14 nations will see a common interest in keeping France 
- one of the technically and militarily most advanced countries of Europe -
as an ally."25 
The debates in the Norwegian Storting showed a wide consensus on 
the Government's attitude on those two major points. Several speakers, 
however, laid major emphasis on the point that "an integrated defence is 
the best defence and also the form of defence that gives the greater 
influence to the minor powers."26 Norway's foreign minister from 1946 
to 1965, Halvard Lange, summed up the arguments in favour of NATO's 
integrated defence system: 
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"The policy of the French Government aims to break down the unified 
command apparatos, and to make more difficult a continued American 
military presence in Europe. If it should succeed, such a policy runs the 
risk of removing the security policy basis for the relative detente which 
we currently enjoy in our part of the world. 
And what would the French Government put in its place? In so far as its 
pu1p0se can be discerned, it seeks an alliance commitment which is not 
anchored in strong common institotions in either the political or military 
field. An alternative network of bilateral arrangements has been suggested. 
This would mean reverting to the state of affairs of the interwar or pre-
World War I periods - a period when all the minor powers of Europe were 
but objects in the games of the great powers, with extremely limited 
possibilities of exerting any influence whatsoever on their destiny. "27 
With those words a senior statesman in NATO expressed what has later 
been echoed by several distinguished students of international affairs and 
of European security problems: The dichotomy between, on the one hand, 
international security cooperation based on the nineteenth century concept 
of alliances as essentially bilateral reassurance arrangements controlled by 
the major powers, and on the other hand the mid-twentieth century 
creation of an integrated, multilateral security system where each member 
nation preserved an influence commensurate with its contribution to the 
common security. Only this latter alternative offered an opportunity for the 
minor powers to exert some influence.28 By failing to grasp this paradig-
matic conflict, or at least try to accommodate those which adhered to the 
latter concept, de Gaulle and his Government demonstrated a disregard for 
the concerns of the minor powers which was bound to have long-term 
effects on those powers' attitudes to and relations with France. 
Conclusion 
In his penetrating analysis of de Gaulle's foreign policy"', Philip G. 
Cerny identifies three conditions that had to be fulfilled if the politics of 
grandeur were to succeed in its pmpose of increasing France's standing 
in the world. One requirement was a domestic consensus in support of the 
necessary "balancing act between national ambition and the avoidance of 
excessive risk or overextension". Another was the need to keep the "grand 
design" itself "sufficiently flexible and sufficiently predictive to be able 
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both to follow and to shape the actual course of events in the international 
system as a whole over time." The frrst of those conditions may have 
been fulfilled. The same can hardly be said for the second one, particular-
ly if the perspective "over time" is extended to include the post-de Gaulle 
years. Where de Gaulle failed most clearly, however, was in relation to 
a third, and probably the most important, requirement: 
"France must not merely represent the French national interest as acting 
against the interests of other states, but rather as creating a solidarity of 
interests with the others. Thus French policy had to appeal to a sufficiently 
widely accepted general or universal principle to ensure the active or tacit 
support of other states in international dealings." 
At least in relation to France's NATO allies, and notably the minor 
powers in the alliance, the "solidarity of interests" that de Gaulle 
presumably hoped would emerge, based on the restoration of national 
independence in defence and security policy, did not materialise. Instead, 
de Gaulle's NATO policy served to reinforce an existing image of France 
as the exponent "par excellence" of a self-centred foreign policy. 
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